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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this Comment is to provide a philosophical commentary on the morality of targeted
killing under the laws of war, particularly when the United States turns its sights on its own
citizens. Although the conclusions drawn are largely antithetical to current practices, they provide
a further critique in the broader discussion of targeted killing. This Comment posits that due
process can never be adequately satisfied when targeted killing is turned against one’s own
citizens. The moral implications associated with targeting one’s own citizens should not be
allowed; rather than defer to International Humanitarian Law, a human rights model as well as
domestic law should be used in assessing the United States’ targeted killing of American citizens,
as these models allow for the utmost preservation of the lives of those being targeted.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the War on Terror, it is no secret that the United States is
engaged in a practice known as targeted killing. Justifying its actions as part
of an ongoing war with al-Qaeda, the United States employs drones, often
remotely piloted by Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) officials, to kill
those insurgents it deems a threat to the American people. Killing in such a
remote manner simultaneously removes the target from the battlefield while
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also “‘remov[ing] potentially messy questions of surrender.’” And whether
or not there is an official CIA roster of those slated to be killed, this makes it
no less than a hit list.
All killing in war is essentially a type of killing via target, as one’s arms
are necessarily aimed at a specific enemy. Consequently, targeted killing for
the purposes of this Comment will be defined as the “premeditated killing
2
by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.” Whereas
proponents of targeted killing insist upon its legality when used against
enemies in either self-defense or under the laws of war, its critics condemn it
3
as “extrajudicial assassination.” However, whether or not targeted killing is
lawful does not necessarily mean that it is a prudent mechanism with which
to carry out a conflict.
This Comment examines the permissibility, under general principles of
the laws of war and morality, of the Obama Administration’s recent use of
the technique of targeted killings to fight the War on Terror. Specifically,
when is it permissible to engage in targeted killing, and is it permissible for
the United States to engage in the targeted killing of an American citizen
under the general principles of the laws of war? This Comment argues that,
under the laws of war, one’s citizenship does not always factor into the
analysis of the use of targeted killing; in fact, under the laws of war, an
enemy’s citizenship is irrelevant to the analysis of whether a country can use
force against that enemy in a traditional war. If a person being targeted has
not made himself open to attack under the laws of war, force is not
warranted, regardless of his citizenship. But when the United States
specifically targets its own citizens, no amount of due process is sufficient to
justify circumventing an American citizen’s right to life. The practice of
targeted killing by the United States against its own citizens should be strictly
forbidden.

1

2

3

Tara Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 13, 2011, 10:00 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html
(quoting Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346–400 (Benjamin Wittes
ed., 2009)).
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 406 (2009). Note that in Murphy and Radsan’s definition, targeted
killing is also defined as “extra-judicial.” This portion of their definition is not used in
this Comment so as to avoid the negative connotations that “extra-judicial” would
unnecessarily bring to the analysis of targeted killing. Id.
Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIATargeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2011). See also David Kretzmer, Targeted
Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2005) (detailing that targeted killings by the United States and Israel
“have been castigated by human rights NGOs, and some UN bodies as ‘extra-judicial
executions’”).
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To reach the aforementioned conclusions, this Comment analyzes the
laws of war and morality in order to inform the legal context of targeted
killing within the United States. As such, just war theory and International
4
Humanitarian Law weigh heavily throughout the Comment’s analysis.
Inherent in the questions presented is the idea that targeted killing is
sometimes justified against non-U.S. citizens. Though it is beyond the scope
of this Comment to engage in a more in-depth, normative discussion of this
conclusion, the following arguments will inform the subject of targeted
killing in general.
To evaluate the controversial topic of targeted killing, Part I of this
Comment provides a brief overview of just war theory and the case of Anwar
al-Aulaqi, an American citizen executed via targeted killing. This serves as a
background for more detailed arguments set forth in later portions of the
Comment. Part II looks to the issue of status, specifically the combatant
versus non-combatant distinction under just war theory, as well as the
importance of uniforms in evaluating combatant status. The increasing
introduction of non-traditional combatants in hostilities makes this
distinction of utmost importance. Building on the analysis of status, Part III
examines the manner in which the United States carries out targeted killing,
specifically when the CIA plays a part. Part IV considers the imminence
required by just war theory, in addition to the constraints of proportionality
and military necessity. The distinction between traditional war and the War
on Terror is explored in Part V, with an emphasis on conflict
characterization in the War on Terror. It is asserted in these first sections
that one’s citizenship does not play a role in many calculations regarding
targeted killing. Oftentimes targeted killing and even the use of force in
general should not be used, as the person that is being targeted has not
made himself liable to be attacked under the laws of war. There are times
when targeted killing is warranted against no one. In terms of the United
States targeting its own citizens, Part VI, the final section, asserts that no
amount of due process can be implemented to circumvent an American
citizen’s right to life; targeted killing by the United States against American
citizens is thereby prohibited. Moreover, the moral implications associated
with targeting one’s own citizens should not be allowed. Rather than defer
to International Humanitarian Law, a human rights model as well as
domestic law should be used in assessing the United States’ targeted killing
of American citizens, as these models allow for the utmost preservation of
4

The distinction between the laws of war and International Humanitarian Law is
essentially obsolete due to their integration into the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions. Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a
Scarecrow of the Law’: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 233, 254 (2003).
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the lives of those being targeted. Ultimately, the goal of this Comment is to
provide a philosophical commentary on the morality of targeted killing
under the laws of war, particularly when the United States turns its sights on
its own citizens. Although the conclusions drawn are largely antithetical to
current practices, they provide a further critique in the broader discussion
of targeted killing.

I. BACKGROUND: JUST WAR THEORY AND THE CASE OF AL-AULAQI
In order to evaluate targeted killing under just war theory, the case of
Anwar al-Aulaqi will be informative throughout this Comment. Born in New
5
Mexico, al-Aulaqi was a Muslim cleric of dual U.S.-Yemeni citizenship. He
was a propagandist for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”) and was
thought to have played a key part in recruiting Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
the man who attempted an airline bombing in Detroit on December 25,
6
2009. Al-Aulaqi also e-mailed with Nidal Hasan six months prior to Hasan’s
7
murder of thirteen men at Fort Hood in November 2009. And although he
was never formally charged in either incident, al-Aulaqi was placed on the
United States government’s kill or capture list in April of 2010, apparently
8
with White House approval. On September 30, 2011, at the age of forty, alAulaqi was killed via a U.S. drone strike, along with Pakistani-American
9
Samir Khan. Khan, who produced a magazine for AQAP promoting
terrorism, was not on the targeted killing list, and was considered “collateral
10
damage.”
As for al-Aulaqi, officials alleged that his role went “beyond
inspiration into operational planning of attacks,” but no proof of such
11
planning has surfaced, and al-Aulaqi received no trial or judicial review.
One month later, al-Aulaqi’s son, sixteen-year-old Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi,
also an American citizen, was killed on October 14, 2011 in another

5
6

7
8

9
10
11

John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi,
159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 175 (2011).
Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011,
at A1 [hereinafter Savage, Secret U.S. Memo]; Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man Is Indicted in
Attempted Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A14.
David Cole, Killing Citizens in Secret, NYRBLOG (Oct. 9, 2011, 11:15 PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/oct/09/killing-citizens-secret.
Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 175; Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action,
in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 156, 160 (Claire
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (referring to the Joint
Prioritized Effects List as a “kill or capture” list).
Yemen:
U.S. strike kills al Qaeda media chief, CBS NEWS (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/10/15/501364/main20120883.shtml.
Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12.
Editorial, Justifying the Killing of an American, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at A22 [hereinafter
Justifying the Killing of an American].
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airstrike. Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi was never alleged to be a part of al-Qaeda,
12
and was in fact collateral damage in the targeting of another man.
Under just war theory, a distinction has historically been drawn between
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. In general, the former deals with war itself, the
responsibility of which is not attributed to soldiers but to a nation’s leaders,
and the latter deals with the conduct of war, the responsibility of which is
13
indeed attributed to soldiers for their own activity. Traditional just war
theory makes such a distinction so as to indemnify soldiers who take part in
criminal wars through no fault of their own, for war is a relation between
political entities; “the enemy soldier, though his war may well be criminal, is
14
nevertheless as blameless as oneself.” Just war theory, rooted in customary
international law, is needed so as to reduce the suffering of war and to allow
15
belligerent states to coexist even after a war.
If it were not for such
customs, war would be an unlimited battle to the death. As Prussian military
theorist Karl von Clausewitz stated, “‘War is an act of force . . . which
16
theoretically can have no limits.’” Enemy states under just war theory are
treated with a sort of restraint and accommodation so as to ensure stability
in the world order; this stability is dependent “upon mutual understandings”
17
in “a world of shared values.”
Within the precepts of jus in bello, then, there are certain practices that
must be followed by states on both sides of a war. The justness or unjustness
of a war in terms of jus ad bellum plays no role, traditionally, in the jus in bello
framework. That is, it is quite possible for an unjust war to be fought justly,
in strict accordance with the laws of war, and for a just war to be fought
18
unjustly. Even if a state is engaged in an unjust war, its soldiers still retain
the right to wound and kill enemy soldiers who are fighting a just war,

12
13

14

15
16
17

18

Craig Whitlock, After Yemen attack, little comment, WASH. POST., Oct. 23, 2011, at A3.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 38–39 (4th ed. 2006). As jus ad bellum and jus in bello are incredibly
complex topics, for the purpose of this Comment, these definitions have been
generalized somewhat.
Id. at 36. See also Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in
Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148, 152–53 (2005) (arguing that war is a
form of “collective exculpation,” granting “permission to do together what would be
infamous crimes if done separately” (emphasis omitted)).
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 255 (setting forth the underlying premise of just
war theory).
WALZER, supra note 13, at 23.
Id. at 116. The United States, not only as part of the world order, but as a world leader,
should follow the rules of just war theory. Moreover, as a signatory to the Geneva
Conventions, it is obligated to do so. Note, however, that the United States has not
ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
See id. at 110 (characterizing a just war as one that is morally urgent to win).
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provided they respect the norms of proportionality and discrimination set
19
forth under International Humanitarian Law.

II. STATUS: THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS
AND NON-COMBATANTS
Though the distinction between just and unjust causes is important, the
principle point of distinction between combatants and non-combatants is
status. Whether or not one is a combatant plays a key role in just war theory.
Non-combatants are not liable to be attacked under just war theory; only
20
other combatants may be the aim of one’s aggression.
Yet if noncombatants take part in hostilities, they in effect breach their duty not to do
so, which “results in the loss of the special protection to which non21
combatants are entitled.”
In terms of capture, combatants cannot be
prosecuted once captured because they are entitled to fight; rather, they
22
receive prisoner of war status if taken by the enemy.
Conversely, noncombatants taking part in hostilities can indeed be prosecuted, as they are
23
not entitled to fight by virtue of their non-combatant status.

A. Status in the War on Terror
However, such distinctions are not so easy to make when combatant
status is blurred. “As ever more warfare involves stipulatively unprivileged
combatants, the normative systems controlling war become more and more
24
strained.” Whereas the Geneva Protocols only accord prisoner of war status
to combatants wearing uniforms or who wear “a fixed, distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance,” it is now often the case that combatants do not
25
wear unique markings to show their status. And the problem is not just
one that arises with our enemies. When CIA field operatives take part in
hostilities, they too blur the line of combatant status: they serve out of
uniform, without clear, outward evidence of their national affiliation. At
issue is whether we can assess the legitimacy of the treatment of nontraditional combatants as they relate to the War on Terror.

19
20
21

22
23
24
25

Kutz, supra note 14, at 157.
WALZER, supra note 13 at 135–37.
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 265. See also JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 12
(2009) (“If posing a threat is the criterion of liability to attack in war, then combatants
are liable but noncombatants are not.”).
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 265. See also WALZER, supra note 13, at 46–47.
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 265.
Kutz, supra note 14, at 155–56.
Id. at 151. This illustration is derived from actual events and is meant as a mirror for what
actually occurs. Id. at 148.
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Although war is usually portrayed under just war theory as combat
between combatants, it is necessary to assess whether those who take part in
the War on Terror are combatants within the traditional sense, because it
has bearing on whether they can be the objects of targeted killing. Indeed,
“one of the primary reasons for distinguishing combatants from non26
Under
combatants is that only combatants are legitimate targets.”
International Humanitarian Law, the targeted killing of suspected terrorists
27
may be lawful if they can be regarded as combatants. Since the group alQaeda is not a member of a nation-state, the conflict between the United
28
States and al-Qaeda is necessarily a non-international conflict.
Given this distinction of the War on Terror as a non-traditional conflict,
it must be assessed whether al-Qaeda fighters are considered combatants or
non-combatants. Under one view, terrorists do not even meet the
conditions of the Geneva Conventions set forth to apply to militias or
29
volunteer corps, and thus must be regarded as civilians.
As a result,
terrorists would be classified as non-combatant civilians unless they are
actively taking a direct part in hostilities. However, such a “‘revolving door’
theory” seems imprudent, as it allows terrorists to remain civilians most of
the time, only sacrificing their status—and hence only being liable to be
30
attacked—when they actually carry out terrorist activities. Though the War
on Terror is not a traditional war, this does not mean that the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants should not be adhered to in a
traditional sense.

B. Terrorists Are Combatants
The more sensible position, it would seem, would be to characterize
terrorists as combatants. Though they have no nation-state to legitimize
their status, they nevertheless are taking part in a conflict that looks much
31
like war. Rather than allow them the ability to only be liable to be attacked
while taking part in attacks, it seems more likely that characterizing them as
combatants would not allow them to circumvent the corresponding liability
to attack that accords with combatant status. Not allowing for combatant
26
27
28
29
30
31

HELEN FROWE, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION 103 (2011).
Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 171.
Whether this conflict is a non-international conflict, or more specifically, a noninternational armed conflict will be evaluated in Part V of this Comment.
Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 191–92. (explaining the arguments for treating al-Qaeda as
non-citizens and citizens).
Id. at 193.
See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 8, at
60, 82–83 (arguing that application of the continuous combat function standard to alQaeda suggests “that these terrorists are trained to continuously operate as terrorists with
the goal of pursuing attacks against the United States and its allies”).
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characterization allows terrorists to enjoy the best of both worlds—not being
liable to be attacked when not taking part in hostilities, but also being able
to unjustly circumvent civilian status for a brief period of time in order to
32
fight.
Though the War on Terror is not a traditional war, terrorists should be
characterized as combatants. They may not belong to a nation-state, but
they still pose a danger in a manner similar to the danger posed by soldiers
who attack as part of a country’s forces. Al-Qaeda combatants would thereby
be akin to the continuous combat function standard adopted by the
33
International Commission of the Red Cross (“ICRC”). Whether labeled as
mere combatants or given the label of a continuous combatant function,
members of al-Qaeda are essentially continuously acting as terrorists, and
hence opening themselves up to attack.

1. Against Terrorists as Combatants?
It nevertheless remains the case that some scholars argue that terrorists
are indeed civilians.
The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions considers civilians to be “all persons who are not members of
the armed forces,” but some scholars contend that in current conflicts
34
“civilians do carry out various military related functions.”
As civilians
directly taking part in hostilities, terrorists would of course not be afforded
the same protections as civilians that do not partake in fighting and pose no
35
threat. They take part in combat unlawfully and “may be tried if captured.”

32

33
34

35

See., e.g. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269 (arguing that if a terrorist is not a
combatant, “once he ceases his participation in the fighting he no longer presents any
danger for the adversary and, having resumed his civilian status, should receive the
protection accorded to civilians and cannot be targeted for an attack” (internal citations
omitted)); Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch’s
Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 49, 66–67
(1993) (“Consquently, all other persons not actively participating in the hostilities by
intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or objects are considered part of
the civilian population . . . . While taking a direct or active role in hostilities, these
individuals forfeit their immunity from direct attack, but retain their status as civilians.
Unlike combatants, once their participation ceases, these civilians may no longer be
attacked, although they may be subject to trial and punishment by the adverse party for
having assumed the role of a combatant.”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1453 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
Cf. Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 60,
82–85 (discussing the continuous combat function).
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269; see also Protocol additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international
armed conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter First
Additional Protocol].
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269.
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Allowing terrorists the status of civilians not only protects them in the sense
36
of the “revolving door” theory, but it also in a sense affords them fewer
protections in that if they are captured they do not receive prisoner of war
37
status. Though perhaps this would be just in the sense that they have given
up their right to not be prosecuted by violating their civilian status, it instead
seems more reasonable to deduce that they have given up their civilian
status completely for the purpose of becoming combatants.
Under the laws of war, to be lawfully targeted while not taking part in
hostilities, the targeted individual must be a combatant. This places the
United States policy of targeted killing under scrutiny: it seems that the
United States does want its targets to be considered combatants when being
targeted, as evidenced by the fact that often times targeted killing takes
place when the target is not involved in hostilities. The implication is that
the United States must consider them to be combatants, assuming the
United States wants to be justified in these killings. This is also true in
capture situations because the United States wants to detain those captured
indefinitely as prisoners of war. What the United States wants, however, is
not the object of this Comment. Rather, what just war theory and morality
require is paramount, as the United States should act in a justified manner
when taking part in targeted killing.
Nor should this analysis change due to the fact that terrorists do not
wear uniforms. Uniforms, implemented in the post-Westphalian rise of
sovereign nation-states, effectively serve as a “stamp of ownership” of a
38
sovereign on his army. On one interpretation, the lack of a uniform can
39
mean that an individual is not part of a collective; “[t]hat a group of
soldiers wears uniforms might be external evidence of internal collective
organization within a larger political community, and requirements of
40
providing such evidence have clear instrumental value.” But construing
status in this manner contains a major flaw. Why may fighters only be able
to assert a collective identity by wearing a uniform? Though it is true that
uniforms serve as a type of external evidence to the collective organization
of a group, does not the brandishing of arms do the same thing? Assuming

36

37

38
39

40

See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 193 (defining the “revolving door” theory as when
terrorists remain civilians most of the time and only sacrifice their civilian status while
actually carrying out terrorist activities).
See FROWE, supra note 26, at 101 (stating that there is a “great moral weight that rests
upon the division between combatants and non-combatants” partially “because of the
importance of according combatants prisoner of war (POW) status”).
Kutz, supra note 14, at 160–61.
Toni Pfanner, Military uniforms and the law of war, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 93, 93–94
(2004) (“The absence of a military uniform usually indicates that a person is a civilian, is
therefore not allowed to perform military functions and must not be attacked.”).
Kutz, supra note 14, at 165.
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that terrorists are indeed part of an organized group, taking part in
hostilities should be enough to assert an outward demonstration of inclusion
in this group. Combatant status should not be dependent upon a mere
41
piece of fabric.

2. The Morality Associated With Terrorists as Combatants
Furthermore, inherent in the combatant versus non-combatant
distinction is the morality associated with these groups, as it is sensible to
accord the same morality to terrorists as combatants. Terrorists, after all, are
not members of a distinct nation-state and therefore are not compelled to
42
fight for a country’s standing army. Rather, terrorists make the conscious
choice to fight. While there may be pressures within their society to
participate, they are not brought into the ranks of terrorist organizations in
an official manner like soldiers are brought to a country’s army. Even if one
made the argument that the War on Terror is a non-international conflict in
which no prisoner of war status exists, and in which unlawful conduct has no
bearing on status determinations, the organizational feature of terrorist
groups may serve to confer combatant status and the associated morality that
comes with this status.
It is imperative to hold terrorists accountable for their actions, both
morally and legally, by making them liable to be attacked. Terrorists must
be accorded combatant status so that they are liable to be killed; as members
of an armed combatant group, they are legitimate targets. Members of alQaeda thereby are exculpated for their actions that accord with the rules of
43
jus in bello, while at the same time they are correspondingly subject to a type
of “reverse inculpation” in that they can then be killed. In this analysis,
making terrorists liable to be attacked seems to be the only way to truly hold
them morally accountable for their actions. Doing so allows them to keep
their actions within the framework of jus in bello while making them
continuously subject to attack.

3. Terrorists, as Combatants, Are Liable to Be Attacked Whether or Not
They Are Just
Setting forth the argument that members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban
are combatants morally liable to be attacked does not finish the analysis,
41

42
43

See id. at 179 (“That she wears no uniform is irrelevant to the collective aspect of her
individual action; and it is the collective aspect that underwrites her privilege. Assuming
she has obeyed the laws of war, she ought to be impunible.”).
See, e.g., FROWE, supra note 26, at 190 (describing terrorists as “non-state actors”).
See Kutz, supra note 14, at 152–53 (asserting that compliance with the laws of war
exculpates only acts by combatants).
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however. According to philosopher Jeff McMahan, al-Qaeda fighters should
be considered truly unjust combatants, as they choose to go to war for an
unjust cause. In his view, “the criterion of liability to attack in war is moral
44
responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat of harm.” Without the
sovereignty of a nation-state, such groups seem to violate the rules of jus ad
bellum while also violating the rules of jus in bello by disregarding certain
norms through targeting civilians and ignoring the imminence and
proportionality required by the laws of war. As a result, in McMahan’s view,
just combatants are able to target unjust combatants (in this example,
45
terrorists), whereas unjust combatants may not target just combatants. In
making this argument, McMahan essentially disregards the distinction
between jus in bello and jus ad bellum; fewer wars will erupt, he believes, if
there is no longer a distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello due to
46
the proposition that more people will refuse to fight in unjust wars.
But the War on Terror seems to refute this conclusion. Since al-Qaeda is
not part of a nation-state in the traditional war sense, it does not compel
people to take up arms against its enemies in the manner that a state could
institute a draft. Rather, al-Qaeda fighters choose to do so, as they have
chosen to pick up their arms. War should at least be restricted to the types
of rules to which combatants on both sides—both just and unjust—need to
adhere. Given this example, it is arguably not within human nature to
forego a cause in which someone believes simply because one may be taking
47
part in a war that another side believes is unjust.
McMahan’s goal
circumvented, we should attempt to restrain war as much as we can by
allowing jus in bello rights to both just and unjust combatants.
Additionally, if only just combatants were morally allowed to take part in
hostilities, this would leave unjust combatants open to attack with very
limited justified means of protecting themselves. As a consequence, unjust
combatants would then be incentivized to violate the jus in bello principles
and protect themselves via unjustified means. Allowing jus in bello rights to
unjust combatants gives them as much incentive as possible to exercise
restraint and abide by just war principles. That is, we want them to adhere
to principles of jus in bello.

44
45
46

47

MCMAHAN, supra note 21, at 35.
Id.
See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 713–14 (2004); see also
Richard V. Meyer, The Privilege of Belligerency and Formal Declarations of War, in TARGETED
KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 183, 187–88 (discussing McMahan’s argument).
WALZER, supra note 13, at 39–40 (stating the underlying premise that while “[i]t
might . . . be thought a matter of individual volition whether particular men join the army
and participate in [a] war . . . [i]t takes courage to doubt” the justifications for the war,
and “most men will be persuaded . . . to fight”).
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This, however, is not promoted by McMahan’s view, which in fact may
48
lead to morally justified soldiers obliterating unjust combatants. That is
anything but morally just. The distinction, therefore, should be between
combatants and non-combatants, regardless of the justness of their causes in
a jus ad bellum framework. Terrorists should be given the right to assert
combatant privileges—and to accept the corresponding risks—despite any
injustice that accompanies their cause. Since they are not part of a nationstate, they are more likely unlawful combatants, but this does not change
their rights in a jus in bello framework. They may not be just in starting
hostilities, but once the hostilities start, combatant status is warranted, along
with its associated privileges and dangers.
In terms of the United States and the practice of targeted killing in
general, this analysis means that al-Qaeda terrorists may indeed be targeted
49
under just war theory because they are combatants. This is an important
distinction because otherwise the use of targeted killing would be overly
permissive. One must be a combatant to be subject to targeted killing.

C. Status as Applied to Americans
The question then remains whether an American citizen who becomes a
part of a terrorist group and takes up arms against the United States is then
liable to be eliminated by the United States via targeted killing. It is true
that International Humanitarian Law does not take citizenship into account
50
when distinguishing civilian and combatant status. And it is also true that
there was no duty to attempt to capture American citizens serving in the
German army during World War II; having taken up arms against their
51
country, they were liable to be attacked and hence killed. The Supreme
Court unmistakably decided that an American citizen could be the subject of
52
the laws of war when he takes up arms against the United States. Nor did
the Court find that American citizenship provides exemption from actions

48

49

50
51
52

MCMAHAN, supra note 21, at 6 (setting forth McMahan’s novel argument “against the
moral equality of combatants” via “the view that unjust combatants act permissibly when
they fight within the constraints of the traditional rules of jus in bello”).
See, e.g., Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1076, 109th Cong. (2005) (“To
authorize the President to detain an enemy combatant who is . . . a member of al Qaeda
or knowingly cooperated with members of al Qaeda . . . .”); Lawrence Azubuike, Status of
Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 152 (2003); Jeff
McMahan, Targeted Killing: Murder, Combat, or Law Enforcement?, in TARGETED KILLINGS,
supra note 8, at 135, 143 (“[T]he Bush Administration claimed that terrorists are
combatants . . . .”).
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1238.
See id. (“In traditional conflicts, the United States has had citizens switch to the other side.
Switched, they become targets just like foreign combatants.”).
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942).
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53

Americans can therefore be considered
permitted by the laws of war.
combatants against the United States.
But it does not necessarily follow that because of this Americans may be
the objects of targeted killing. With at least three Americans citizens
54
reportedly on the United States’ targeted killing list —not including, of
course, the already targeted al-Aulaqi—such an issue is more important than
ever. The final part of this Comment asserts that it is both immoral and
illegal for the United States to take part in targeted killings against its own
citizens, even if they are combatants. In the intervening parts, the manner
in which the United States can use targeted killings against anyone, whether
American or not, under the laws of war and morality will be further refined.

III. STATUS CONTINUED: THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CIA IN
TARGETED KILLINGS PERPETRATED BY THE UNITED STATES
First and foremost, the manner in which the United States engages in
targeted killing must be the subject of critique. If branches of the military
were the sole perpetrators of targeted killing, there would be far fewer
objections, as members of the armed forces are truly regarded as combatants
55
under just war theory. A problem arises, however, when targeted killing is
perpetrated outside of the military, mainly by the CIA.
The use of CIA operatives began with a single strike in Pakistan in 2004,
56
but has since increased. During President Obama’s tenure in office, he
intensified the CIA’s drone program, carrying out more missile strikes inside
Pakistan’s borders in his first year in office than George W. Bush authorized
57
in his eight years as president.
This effectively amounts to civilian
participation in combat, which is prohibited by the 1977 Additional
58
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. In this view, CIA officers are not
53

54
55

56
57
58

See, e.g., Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 308–10 (1909) (“A neutral,
or a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the enemy’s country . . . is deemed as much
an alien enemy as a person actually born under the allegiance and residing within the
dominions of the hostile nation.”); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 671, 674 (1862)
(holding that citizens of the southern states during the Civil War could be blockaded or
have their property confiscated according to the laws of war).
Dana Priest, U.S. playing a key role in Yemen attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A1.
See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 13, at 36 (“Though there is no license [to kill] for warmakers, there is a license [to kill] for soldiers, and they hold it without regard to which
side they are on; it is the first and most important of their war rights.”).
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1215–16.
Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011, at 35, 37.
See First Additional Protocol, supra note 34, at arts. 43, 51 (providing that “[m]embers of
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the
right
to
participate
directly
in
hostilities”
and
“[c]ivilians
shall
enjoy . . . protection . . . unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”).
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lawful combatants under just war theory because they: 1) are not part of a
military chain of command; 2) do not wear uniforms; and 3) are not trained
59
in the laws of war. The question of distinction then becomes whether CIA
agents who partake in targeted killing are granted combatant or civilian
status.
To be certain, there is a degree of overlap between the CIA and the
60
military. Cooperation between the CIA and the Pentagon was particularly
apparent in “Operation Neptune Spear,” the mission to kill Osama bin
61
Laden. During the planning of this mission, the operation was essentially
designed at CIA headquarters and authorized by the CIA; but the Navy
62
conducted the mission itself. Regardless of this overlap, though, the CIA is
not a formal part of the United States military. It is a separate government
entity. In this sense, it must be recognized that CIA agents’ participation in
the War on Terror is somewhat parallel to those they target in that they are
not an official part of a higher military chain of command. Neither CIA
agents nor the terrorists they target are members of a military force of a
nation-state. In fact, it has been asserted by some that CIA agents are
63
unlawful combatants. However, unlike those they target, CIA agents are
members of a country that does have the ability to field an army. As a result,
can they really be all that similar?
Even the United States is at times careful to distinguish the boundaries
of CIA involvement, as the Air Force is responsible for targeted killing within
the clear war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas the CIA controls
64
targeted killing operations in northwest Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
This Comment argues that this distinction cannot be mere coincidence:
government officials surely recognize that CIA agents are not part of the
armed forces and thus are not accorded all of the privileges of combatant
65
status. If the CIA existed in a society where military command did not

59
60

61

62
63
64
65

While the United States is not a signatory to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, the United States still considers the prohibition of civilian participation in
combat as proscribed under customary international law, which is binding upon all
nations. Gary Solis, America’s unlawful combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17.
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1206.
This is evidenced by the fact that Leon E. Panetta, the former Director of the CIA, is now
the Secretary of Defense. Leon E. Panetta: Secretary of Defense, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=310 (last visited Oct. 2,
2012).
For a scholarly narrative of CIA involvement in the killing of Osama bin Laden, see Kevin
H. Govern, Operation Neptune Spear: Was Killing bin Laden a Legitimate Military Objective?, in
TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 347, 352–53.
Schmidle, supra note 57, at 38.
Solis, supra note 58, at A17.
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1202.
David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 957, 957, 1016 (2009) (setting forth the general premise, upon which the
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exist, the result would be much different. Al-Qaeda does not have the ability
to set forth an army in the sense that the United States does. So while alQaeda fighters are accorded combatant status—albeit unlawful combatant
status—the CIA is not. The United States as a sovereign nation-state must be
held to higher standards. The United States sets itself forward as a leading
nation, one whose democratic ideals should be followed by other countries
throughout the world. It must, then, hold itself to these high standards.
But in some ways this distinction may not even matter. Regardless of
whether CIA agents are combatants or civilians, they open themselves up to
attack. CIA agents take part in hostilities and as such render themselves
66
lawful targets. The importance of the distinction matters when taking into
account the manner in which the CIA is permitted to take part in hostilities.
Though the distinction may not be intuitive, it would seem the weight of
evidence points towards their civilian status. It was asserted above that the
lack of uniforms for terrorists does not mean that they are necessarily
civilians. However, in the context of American involvement, the distinction
may mean more since the United States actively chooses to allow a
governmental entity aside from the military to take part in combat. The U.S.
could choose for the Air Force to carry out all targeted killing, but it does
not. Thus, not only does the United States decide to violate the laws of war
by engaging the CIA, a branch that lacks uniforms or distinguishing insignia,
in hostilities, but it also violates the laws of war by not allowing its distinct
military branches to carry out these same hostilities. In order for the United
States to conduct targeted killings in accordance with the laws of war—and
in a manner consistent with heightened morality—the CIA should not be
associated with targeted killings.

IV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF IMMINENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY UNDER
THE LAWS OF WAR
In terms of just war theory, then, it is necessary to evaluate when the
United States can in fact take part in targeted killing. Under International
Humanitarian Law, use of force in self-defense by a victim state must
conform to the requirements of imminence and proportionality—and
67
hence military necessity—in order to be just.

66
67

author expands, that members of al-Qaeda can be legally targeted by the military, but
that the CIA’s role in targeting al-Qaeda “undermines the legality of these actions”).
Solis, supra note 58, at A17.
See FROWE, supra note 26, at 36–37, 53–54 (asserting that “[a] state can be said to have a
just cause for war . . . if it is about to suffer an appropriate wrong” and “[i]n order for a
war to be just, it must be a proportionate response”).
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A. Imminence
The strict construction of imminence set forth by United States Secretary
of State Daniel Webster in the nineteenth century may be a bit too
constricting in that it requires that there be “‘a necessity of self-defence [that
is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
68
deliberation.’” Rather than wait for the seconds before an attack occurs,
imminence is satisfied in a looser sense if an attack is indeed planned and it
69
will be carried out in a short period of time. The United States need not
wait until a terrorist is about to detonate a bomb in order to act. But, a
terrorist must have a plan in mind and the ability to carry out an attack for
his attack to be imminent and hence warrant a preemptive strike of selfdefense by the United States. Moreover, a response by the United States
must be necessary militarily in that use of force is “future-oriented, i.e.,
halting or repelling an attack”; for the United States’ response to be
justified, another alternative option to force, such as capture, must not be
70
available.
What this means in terms of targeted killing is perhaps not facially clear.
Many terrorists that are the targets of drones are not actively involved in
terrorist threats at the time they are killed. They are going about the
ordinary, daily business of their lives when a CIA operative sitting at Langley
Air Force Base in McLean, Virginia detonates a drone and thereby kills
71
them. Assuming that the person that is targeted is actually a member of a
terrorist group like al-Qaeda or the Taliban, he is, as discussed above, a
combatant and can be the object of attack. But as to the imminence
requirement, it seems that perhaps one cannot be targeted at any time
whatsoever. To be subject to attack, it is not enough for a terrorist to
participate; he must be involved in the planning or carrying out of specific
attacks on his enemy. It is conceivable that one need not be on his way to
detonate a bomb for the imminence requirement to be satisfied, but some
68
69
70

71

Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 179; see also WALZER, supra note 13, at 74 (citing Webster’s
speech as to imminence in terms of pre-emptive violence).
WALZER, supra note 13, at 74.
Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 187–88; see also WALZER, supra note 13, at 74 (“Both individuals
and states can rightfully defend themselves against violence that is imminent but not
actual; they can fire the first shots if they know themselves about to be attacked.”); Dehn
& Heller, supra note 5, at 177 (stating that al-Aulaqi’s father argued that “both the
Constitution and international law prohibit targeted killing except as a last resort to
protect against concrete, specific, and imminent threats of death or serious physical
injury” (quoting Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Al-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (Civil Action No. 10-1469))); Radsan & Murphy,
supra note 3, at 1206 (asserting International Humanitarian Law “insists that military
necessity justify all attacks: an attack should reasonably be expected to create a concrete
and direct military advantage”).
Solis, supra note 58, at A17.
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type of outward participation in the planning of future hostilities must occur
for the imminence requirement to be met. This is true regardless of one’s
citizenship under just war theory.
The case becomes much more difficult when one has not taken up arms
in a war, whether traditional or not. In a traditional war, a state’s leader may
potentially be the target of attack in that his existence makes further fighting
72
abundantly more imminent. But what if one is merely the source of a
cause’s rhetoric? One’s words can spur a soldier to fight, but can these
73
words really be considered the source of imminence? The difficulty of this
question points towards a case-by-case assessment of one’s role in whatever
war is taking place. For instance, following this line of reasoning, if one is
merely setting forth an argument for the superiority of one’s faith and the
duty of its followers to spread its word, then imminence arguably would not
be satisfied. However, if one explicitly spurs someone to carry out acts of
violent jihad, then imminence may indeed be satisfied. But even then
imminence must be explicit. When one does not take up arms against an
enemy and rather brandishes a pen, a significantly higher degree of
imminence should be required to justify the targeting of an enemy.
According to the United States, the imminence criterion can be satisfied
when a person is found to be “the leader of a group that [seeks] to attack
the United States whenever” given the opportunity, regardless of whether or
74
not the person was involved in an attack when targeted. This is probably
true. Since terrorists are, as argued above, given combatant status, its
leaders, as combatants, may also be targeted. However, this criterion must
actually be met. In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, this was arguably not
satisfied, at least according to information now available. The United States
75
deemed al-Aulaqi an imminent threat because he was a leader of AQAP.
All that has really been asserted, though, is that he was at most merely a
76
propagandist and at the very least a Muslim cleric. While it is true that al77
Aulaqi was accused of playing more of “an operational role in [AQAP],”
there is no independent evidence of this other than the government’s word;

72

73

74
75
76
77

See Geoffrey Robertson, Is It Lawful to Kill Gaddafi?, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 31, 2011, 5:04
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/31/is-it-lawful-to-kill-gaddafi.html
(arguing that under just war theory an enemy leader may be killed if there is “‘military
necessity,’” but that “perfidious means such as spies or assassins” may not be used).
Anatol Rapoport, Introduction to CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, 1, 11 (1967) (“[T]he
nature of war is itself to a large extent determined by how man conceives of it.”); David
Kennedy, Modern War and Modern Law, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 183 (2007) (“And
communicating the war is fighting the war.”).
Cole, supra note 7.
Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12.
Id.
Id.
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any concrete evidence that the government might have of al-Aulaqi playing
78
an active role has not been released. Though the cause of groups like alQaeda and AQAP is necessarily bound up with religious beliefs, this does not
mean that clerics should be considered leaders. Would we ever want our
own religious leaders targeted? One would think not. The interest of world
stability, which is presumably implicated in such an analysis, should require
more proof than sheer religious rhetoric; hence, imminence is not satisfied
by mere propaganda that does not cross the line of telling one to fight,
regardless of the propagandists’ citizenship.
79
Al-Aulaqi was a propagandist, not a soldier, and thus did not present an
imminent risk to the United States. He was not found on a battlefield when
he was killed. Rather, he was in Yemen at the time of his death, far from the
80
active battlegrounds of Afghanistan or Pakistan.
It is true that in
International Humanitarian Law it “is not the location of the attack, but the
81
status of the attacker and target” that matter. While this functional—as
opposed to territorial—view of just war theory must be taken into account,
the proximity of a combatant to the battlefield perhaps directly corresponds
to the imminence requirement. Short of directing hostile attacks from afar,
one cannot be deemed an imminent threat if one is not actively taking part
in a threat. On information now available, al-Aulaqi was arguably not such a
leader.
The legal memo drafted by the Obama Administration to justify
targeting al-Aulaqi furthermore concluded that “what was reasonable, and
the process that was due, was different for Mr. [al-Aulaqi] than for an
82
ordinary criminal.” Such an argument brings forth a domestic analogy, in
which al-Aulaqi’s life was being likened to that of a criminal in a law
enforcement model. Regarding imminence, it would seem that a law
enforcement model for targeted killing would actually be less permissive
than an analysis under the laws of war. The law enforcement model of
legality rests primarily on international human rights law standards, which
have a type of reverence for life and thereby are necessarily more restrictive
83
than the laws of war. Rather than citing imminence, the Model Penal Code
in fact uses the term “immediately necessary” in terms of its imminence
84
requirement.
“Immediately necessary” inevitably falls on the more
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Cole, supra note 7 (characterizing the claims against al-Aulaqi as “unofficial ‘allegations’
of encouragement”).
Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12; Cole, supra note 7.
Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1; Mary L. Dudziak, This War Is Not Over Yet,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at A31.
Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190.
Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12 (reporting on the memo).
Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 174.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(1) (1985).
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restrictive end of the imminence scale. Under this view, “use of force can
never be regarded as necessary (let alone absolutely necessary) unless it is
clear that there was no feasible possibility of protecting the prospective
85
victim by apprehending the suspected perpetrator.” That is, one must use
restraint and capture a suspect unless doing so would cause harm to a
potential victim.
In terms of targeted killing, this would translate to mean that one may
use targeted killing against a terrorist in self-defense only if he serves as a
threat that must be immediately guarded against and if capture is not feasible.
Only then would targeted killing be warranted. Though the laws of war and
criminal law are somewhat analogous, the latter is much more limiting, and
under its view targeted killing should not be used until the last possible
moment. Given the attributes of targeted killing, waiting until such a time is
most likely not possible. The law enforcement model hence does not
inform the issue of targeted killing in a manner consistent with the Obama
Administration’s use of it. Its application is impractical.

B. Proportionality
In terms of proportionality, International Humanitarian Law
furthermore requires that attacks may not result in “excessive ‘collateral
86
damage.’” If the United States is to engage in targeted killing, then, the
resulting destruction of killing a terrorist may not exceed the good that is
gained by not allowing the terroristic act to proceed. This raises the
question of which life is more important: the life of an enemy civilian, or
87
the life of one’s own combatants. Although some argue that one’s own
88
combatants’ lives are always worth more than an enemy civilian’s life, this is
not an appropriate, moral balancing of lives. Enemy civilians are considered
89
unlawful targets under International Humanitarian Law. Targeted killing
must be reasonably restricted to killing as few enemy civilians as possible; as
85

86
87

88
89

Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 179; cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384, 386 (2007) (citing the
proposition that deadly force is reasonable when one poses an “actual and imminent
threat”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (setting forth the idea that in criminal
law preventive killing is impermissible except where there is probable cause to believe the
suspect is dangerous to others).
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1206.
There are four groups that are relevant to this analysis: one’s own civilians, one’s own
combatants, civilians in an enemy state (“enemy civilians”), and combatants from an
enemy state (“enemy combatants”).
Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective, 4 J. MIL.
ETHICS 3, 18 (2005).
First Additional Protocol, supra note 34, at art. 50 (essentially defining civilians in the
negative as all persons who are not combatants); WALZER, supra note 13, at 136
(“‘Soldiers are made to be killed,’ as Napoleon once said . . . [N]o one else is made to be
killed.”).
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civilians, they have not opened themselves to attack and are thus not liable
to be killed.
“The war convention rests . . . on a certain view of
noncombatants, which holds that they are men and women with rights and
that they cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate
90
purpose.” This is not to say that one may not value one’s own civilians with
higher priority than an enemy’s civilians. However, this means that an
enemy’s civilians should be prioritized over one’s own soldiers’ lives, as the
latter have opened themselves up to attack while the former have not.
A utilitarian argument can be made for the justification of the killing of
some enemy civilians if the benefits of taking out a terrorist with some
civilian collateral damage outweigh the risks to one’s own civilian population
91
by not killing the terrorist. But in a non-traditional war, and without a
specific situation presented, it would seem that it is prudent to argue for no
civilian deaths. The blurred state of affairs inherent in the War on Terror
necessitates caution. Proportionality, therefore, requires that in many cases
one must attempt capture rather than targeted killing despite the added
danger to one’s troops so as to reduce the possibility of civilian deaths.
Regarding the domestic analogy, proportionality means that when
targeted killing takes place, one must believe that not using force will result
92
in the person being targeted “caus[ing] death or serious bodily injury.”
This limits targeted killing in that it must be believed that the person being
targeted is involved in causing deadly force. It is therefore not enough for
one to simply be a driver or a cook for an enemy cause to be the object of
targeted killing. However, the law enforcement model also means that one
must “believe[] that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to
93
innocent persons.”
Rather than limiting targeted killing, this in effect
allows one to be exculpated for those innocent deaths that could not have
been predicted. It is true that it guards against innocents being explicitly
targeted, but it implicitly accepts that there will be innocent casualties. Such
consequences should not be allowed. If innocent lives become collateral
damage, the associated consequences of violating the laws of war should be
accepted. Those that engage in targeted killing must be held responsible
94
for the destruction they cause to innocents.
90
91

92
93
94

WALZER, supra note 13, at 137.
For a description of such a utilitarian argument, see id. at 146 (arguing “[t]he relevant
distinction is not between those who work for the war effort and those who do not, but
between those who make what soldiers need to fight and those who make what they need
to live, like all the rest of us. When it is militarily necessary, workers in a tank factory can
be attacked and killed, but not workers in a food processing plant”).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(iv)(B) (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(iii) (1985) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 13, at 136–37 (“[T]he law can be enforced even by criminal
states against ‘policemen’ who deliberately kill innocent bystanders. For these bystanders
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Targeted killing, as all acts of war under just war theory, therefore must
be constrained to the extent that engaging in targeted killing should not
enable a disproportionate amount of force to be used against one’s
95
In many cases, this may mean that capture is preferable to
enemies.
targeted killing. Capture effectively takes one’s enemy off the battlefield,
thereby circumventing any efforts he is involved in against the state that
conducts the capture. Capture would seem preferable to targeted killing in
most instances, but the policy of targeted killing has been taken up by the
United States, and the United States will most likely not turn back. It should
be ensured, then, that when targeted killing is conducted, that it satisfies the
proportionality requirement.
When the possibility of civilian death is apparent, proportionality is not
satisfied. Accordingly, in the War on Terror, it is not apparent that such
proportionality is in fact met. According to some accounts, as many as an
96
average of fifty civilians are killed for every intended target. While this may
97
be an overestimated figure, it remains that the United States calculates the
number of civilian casualties resulting from its drone strikes using a method
of calculation that brings into question both proportionality and morality.
The procedure by which civilian casualties are calculated by the United
States consists of including all military-age males killed in the strike zone as
98
combatants, unless there is unambiguous intelligence to the contrary.
This, as one administration official has called it, is “‘guilt by association’ that
99
has led to ‘deceptive’ estimates of civilian casualties.” Consequently, the
United States can claim proportionality by willfully ignoring that innocents
are being killed.
Such a procedure not only leads to a lack of
proportionality, but it is also anything but moral.
It is perhaps not easy to draw a line where too many civilians have been
killed. But though the line is difficult to draw, “that does not mean that no
100
line should be drawn.”
Morally, any civilian death is too much. When
even one civilian is killed while engaging in targeted killing, this is too much

95

96
97
98
99
100

do not forfeit their rights when their states wrongly go to war. An army warring against
aggression . . . cannot violate the life and liberty of enemy civilians.”).
See WALZER, supra note 13, at 129 (“In the conduct of hostilities, it is not permissible to do
‘any mischief which does not tend materially to the end [of victory], nor any mischief of
which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison with the amount of the
mischief.’” (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 254 (1891))).
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1221.
Id. (characterizing the estimate of fifty civilians killed for every intended target as a
“remarkable figure,” and suggesting by implication that this figure is overestimated).
Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1.
Id.
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, Mr. Truman’s Degree, in 3 THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE 62, 67 (1981).
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civilian death. Again, a consequentialist argument would disagree and argue
that one’s own civilians saved by a terrorist threat that has been avoided by
engaging in targeted killing outweighs the civilian deaths of one’s
101
Given that many of these threats also occur at a time when the
enemies.
factor of imminence is questionable, though, a questionable balancing of
proportionality does not sway the decision.
In Anwar al-Aulaqi’s situation, the United States decided that killing al102
Aulaqi was permissible if capture was not feasible.
Even if it is accepted
that targeting an American citizen is permissible, it was not so justified in
this instance. When al-Aulaqi was killed, so too was another American,
103
Samir Khan. Khan also never took up arms against the United States. The
United States effectively killed its own civilian, a life that should be
prioritized in the utmost regard. When one’s own citizens could possibly
become collateral damage, targeted killing is never warranted. Perhaps the
United States did not know that Khan was present when they targeted alAulaqi, but that is not a defense to killing one’s own citizen. Targeted
killing should only take place in a situation where the certainty of safety for
one’s own citizens is guaranteed. That criterion was obviously violated when
Khan was killed.

V. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFLICT CHARACTERIZATION
Building off of the previously discussed categories that inform the
discussion of targeted killing, the characterization of the conflict itself is also
important. According to the Geneva Convention, a conflict is international
104
when it is waged between two or more states.
All other conflicts are
105
necessarily non-international.
Due to the lack of state boundaries in the
latter type of conflicts, a “substantially higher threshold” must be met for an
armed conflict to exist; this is so that it is possible to distinguish an armed
conflict from acts of short and unorganized insurrections, banditry, and

101

102
103
104
105

An example of such balancing can be seen in the World War II bombing of Hiroshima.
American leaders effectively made the decision that the bombing “would save lives where
the lives counted [were] the lives of American soldiers. The lives of Japanese, military or
civilian, presumably counted for less.” JOHN RAWLS, Fifty Years after Hiroshima, in
COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 570 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (explaining that a utilitarian
seeks to promote overall utility, which involves a calculation of net utility, rather than
promote or protect the rights of individuals).
Cole, supra note 7.
Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
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106

Terrorist activities may therefore
even in some cases, terrorist activities.
sometimes be characterized as unarmed conflicts, especially when such
aggression is intermittent.
When an unarmed conflict exists, states are restricted in their resort to
107
force. This Comment argues that targeted killing should not be permitted
in these instances; an armed conflict, whether it is international or not, must
exist for the threshold issue of targeted killing to be permitted. This is true
regardless of the citizenship of the person targeted. If a war does not exist,
traditional or not, targeted killing should not occur. A terrorist in an
unarmed conflict does open himself up to attack when actively carrying out
108
hostilities, but then capture must occur after this stage.
For instance,
Timothy McVeigh, having bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
109
Oklahoma City, could not be the object of targeted killing after the
bombing took place; short of a standoff between himself and police, it would
be necessary to capture him. This would be true whether or not he was an
American citizen. In an armed conflict, though, targeted killing may be
110
permitted, as the rules of jus in bello apply in an armed conflict; the
applicability of just war theory to such a conflict may warrant the targeting of
one’s enemies that pose an imminent risk.

A. The War on Terror Is a Non-International Armed Conflict
According to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)
and various Supreme Court decisions, the conflict with al-Qaeda is a non111
international armed conflict.
However, some scholars criticize this
112
characterization as an overly permissive classification.
To them, the War
on Terror amounts to “sporadic acts of terrorism” not amounting to a noninternational armed conflict; they argue that only International
106
107
108
109
110
111

112

Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 257.
Stephen C. Neff, Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict: A Proposal for a New International Law
of Hostility, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 5, 28 (1995).
In many cases of unarmed conflict this point is probably moot as many terrorists kill
themselves when carrying out terrorist plots.
Dale Russakoff & Serge F. Kovaleski, An Ordinary Boy’s Extraordinary Rage, WASH. POST,
July 2, 1995, at A1.
See Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 186 (defining jus in bello as International Humanitarian Law
that governs parties in an armed conflict).
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (explaining
that the conflict with al-Qaeda is not a conflict of an “‘international character’”); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526–27 (2004). See also Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190
(arguing that “whatever the substantive international law on the subject, the AUMF and
Supreme Court decisions interpreting it have established in U.S. law the existence of an
armed conflict and the authority to exercise belligerent powers—such as armed attacks
and preventive detentions”).
See id. at 190.
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Humanitarian Law scholars of American nationality truly believe that the
113
War on Terror is an armed conflict. But characterizing the War on Terror
as a non-international unarmed conflict neglects the fact that this conflict
has been ongoing for more than a decade. Though fighting may not occur
114
on a regular basis, it is anything but sporadic.
The War on Terror has
consisted of continuous fighting. And it is not just the United States that
sanctions such a categorization. When other members of the United
Nations take part in the War on Terror, they too implicitly agree with the
portrayal of the War on Terror as an armed conflict. Consequently, the War
115
on Terror should be classified as a non-international armed conflict.
The question then remains as to what groups exactly are a part of this
non-international armed conflict.
The AUMF provides the legal
authorization for the use of force against those groups that “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001”; under the AUMF those groups are in conflict with the
116
United States.
It follows that the members of the groups implicitly listed
by the AUMF, namely al-Qaeda and the Taliban, receive combatant status
and may be on the receiving end of force employed by the United States. So
long as a member of al-Qaeda or the Taliban presents an imminent threat,
and targeted killing is deemed proportionate, targeted killing may be
utilized. Though this analysis seems relatively straightforward, in practice it
may not be so simple, as some groups against which the United States
employs targeted killing are not covered by the AUMF and therefore may
not be targeted.

B. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Is Not a Part of the Non-International
Armed Conflict that Exists Under the AUMF
For instance, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”) cannot be
sufficiently characterized as a member of al-Qaeda in the sense required for
it to be the target of U.S. animosity. Given the use of force against members
of AQAP, it is apparent that the United States government does not agree
117
with this assertion. It deems AQAP a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda.

113
114

115
116
117

Id. at 197.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
Claudette Roulo, Panetta: Nation Faces ‘Dangerous and Unpredictable’ World, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF. (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118273.
This conclusion is consistent with Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190.
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
See, e.g., Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190 (suggesting that “the Government argue[s]
that AQAP is either part of al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or cobelligerent, of alQaeda that has directed attacks against the United States” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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Consequently, government officials would assert that AQAP is a force
associated with al-Qaeda and is thus part of the armed conflict between the
118
United States and al-Qaeda.
Despite such assertions by the United States government, there is a basis
in just war theory for rejecting AQAP as a part of the conflict that is the War
on Terror. There is no customary rule in just war theory that allows cobelligerency to apply to non-state actors in a non-international armed
119
conflict.
It must be asserted that AQAP is a distinct organization from alQaeda, and hence is not a target that the United States may consider as
covered by the AUMF. Consequently, the AUMF does not cover hostilities
against AQAP: AQAP is an organization founded in Yemen, long after the
120
attacks of September 11, 2001 that prompted the issuance of the AUMF.
Just war theory should limit the interpretation of the AUMF, not merely
121
inform it.
Moreover, due to the fact that co-belligerency is not permitted in noninternational conflicts, it is also pertinent that al-Qaeda is not organized at a
global level to a sufficient extent for the two groups to be considered one
122
organization. It is simply not enough to say that AQAP is an enemy on par
with al-Qaeda because the United States says so; the groups must be
sufficiently organized so as to warrant singular status in order for AQAP to
truly be a part of the armed conflict with the United States. In the case of alQaeda and AQAP, that requirement arguably has not been met. They may
share a common goal, but their interconnections stop there. Al-Qaeda and
AQAP are separate entities with separate leadership. Furthermore, “the
‘combat’ [between the United States and AQAP] is not even close to being
sufficiently protracted or intense” to be characterized as a non-international
123
armed conflict.
Hostilities between the United States and AQAP are too
118
119

120
121

122
123

Id.
Conversely, in a more traditional war, co-belligerency among state actors is recognized.
The problem arises in this case due to the non-international nature of the hostilities. See
Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 200 (arguing that one “reason[] why cobelligerency does
not apply to nonstate actors in [non-international armed conflicts]” is due to the fact that
there is a “complete absence of state practice . . . supporting the existence of such a
customary rule”).
Cole, supra note 7.
Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 200–01 (“It is no accident that the United States claims
the interpretation of the AUMF is ‘informed’ by the laws of war, not limited by them. . . .
If IHL limited the AUMF, the government would not be able to maintain either the
fiction that the United States is involved in a global [non-international armed conflict]
with al-Qaeda or the fiction that cobelligerency applies to nonstate actors in [noninternational armed conflicts]. And without those fictions, the government would find it
much more difficult to justify its position that the laws of war entitle it to kill [a]lAulaqi.”).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 183.
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intermittent. The United States may still assert force against AQAP to
defend itself, but the United States is more constrained in its ability to target
AQAP because an armed conflict does not exist. Targeted killing is only
warranted when an armed conflict exists.
In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, then, he was not adequately associated
with the specific non-international armed conflicts in Afghanistan and
124
Pakistan for targeted killing to be allowed.
The targeted killing of alAulaqi did not take place in the context of an armed conflict. Moreover,
lethal force was not warranted, as it was not absolutely necessary. He was not
part of a non-international armed conflict with the United States because he
was not even alleged to be a part of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the two groups
125
Congress has authorized force against under the AUMF.
He was not a
combatant against which targeted killing should have been used, regardless
of his citizenship.

VI. THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS: WHEN TARGETED KILLING IS
TURNED ON OUR OWN
What, then, should occur when an American is targeted? Despite the
prudence of distinguishing citizens from non-citizens, according to some
scholars there is not a problem with using targeted killing against American
126
citizens per se.
These scholars assert that the United States government
has just as much standing to kill Americans as it does non-Americans, which
is to say that due process must be satisfied in both cases. The problem, in
this view, is not that an American is killed, but that the missiles could be
fired inaccurately or without justification, resulting in death for individuals
127
who were not meant to be targeted.
This could not be further from the
truth, as historically the United States has indeed taken into account one’s

124

125
126

127

The United States reportedly used many of the arguments set forth in the prior
paragraph to assert its right to target al-Aulaqi. Cf. Cole, supra note 7 (describing the
government’s position on al-Aulaqi as “the leader of AQAP, which it deemed a ‘cobelligerent,’ effectively fighting alongside al-Qaeda itself”); Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra
note 6, at A12 (setting forth the government’s argument that the AUMF covered alAulaqi’s killing, thereby making him “a lawful target in the armed conflict”); Dehn &
Heller, supra note 5, at 178 (characterizing the clash with AQAP as “a congressionally
authorized, armed conflict”).
Cole, supra note 7.
See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1238 (“[M]orally speaking . . . the U.S. government
has just as much standing to kill Americans as non-Americans.”); Murphy & Radsan, supra
note 2, at 405 (“[U]nder Boumediene, the executive has a due process obligation to
develop fair, rational procedures for its use of targeted killing no matter whom it might
be targeting anywhere in the world.”).
Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1207.
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citizenship when administering justice against Americans who have turned
against our country.

A. The History of Due Process Towards American Traitors
The Constitution itself provides for the possibility that Americans will
turn against their own government. The Constitution states in relevant part:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
128
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

An American citizen does not receive fewer rights under the Treason Clause;
the Constitution explicitly provides for guarantees of a citizen’s rights in
those instances in which treason, as clearly defined in this subsection,
occurs. Those citizens who levy war against the United States are thereby
“entitled to specific procedural protections,” namely the requirements that
there must be at least two witnesses against the accused traitor as well as
129
prosecution before an Article III court.
The requirements explicitly laid
out in the Constitution do not allow for military authority—such as the
decision to use targeted killing—against one’s own citizens who have
130
committed treason.
However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin, in which
the Court approved a military trial and execution of an American citizen
who aided Nazi Germany, the law essentially changed. Since that time the
Court has failed to recognize a distinction between those subject to treason,
and hence granted due process within the criminal justice system, and those
131
subject to military authority as enemies of the United States. Regardless of
this modification to the traditional rule of treason, the fact that it is
contained within the Constitution is informative in itself. Its inclusion
provides a strong argument for those people who engage in acts of war or
aid the enemy to keep their rights that they have by virtue of being
American citizens.

128
129
130
131

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006).
Id. at 863.
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (granting unlawful combatants a right to trial
and punishment by military tribunal); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–20
(2004) (upholding the Quirin decision).
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Inherent in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin is the idea
132
that citizens will receive some sort of process under military authority. But
this is not what happens with targeted killing. When the United States
engages in targeted killing, the person who is targeted is, as argued below,
killed without sufficient due process. As evidenced by the inclusion of the
Treason Clause in the Constitution, the War on Terror is clearly not the first
133
time that an American citizen has betrayed the United States.
The
Constitution ensures the rights of Americans whether they are loyal or not.

B. Due Process: The Rights of Americans To Not Be the Objects of Targeted
Killing
In order to evaluate the rights of American citizens within the War on
Terror it is necessary to ask what an American citizen’s protections would be
if he were indeed a part of al-Qaeda. The case of Anwar al-Aulaqi is still
informative on this discussion, as the United States effectively granted him
the same status that it would have granted an American member of alQaeda. This is due to the fact that the United States deems AQAP a cobelligerent of al-Qaeda that is a combatant under the AUMF. For the
purpose of this argument, several assumptions will be made. First, the
argument assumes that al-Aulaqi was indeed a lawful combatant involved
with al-Qaeda in the armed conflict against the United States. After all, that
is precisely what lawyers in the Obama Administration claimed when they
134
wrote a memo justifying the killing of al-Aulaqi.
Second, the argument
assumes that the CIA does not partake in targeted killing so as to cure any
135
issues regarding their status under the laws of war.

1. Justifying the Targeted Killing of Americans: The Secret Office of Legal
Counsel Memo
The memo justifying the targeting of al-Aulaqi, which has yet to be
released, measures roughly fifty pages in length, and was principally drafted
by two lawyers in the Obama Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”), David Barron and Martin Lederman. Completed in June 2010,
132

133

134
135

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44 (“Since the Amendments, like § 2 of Article III, do not
preclude all trials of offenses against the law of war by military commission without a jury
when the offenders are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is plain that they
present no greater obstacle to the trial in like manner of citizen enemies who have
violated the law of war applicable to enemies.”).
Note that treason charges have been brought approximately thirty times since the passing
of the Constitution. Douglas A. Kash, The United States v. Adam Gadahn: A Case for
Treason, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008).
Justifying the Killing of an American, supra note 11, at A22.
See supra Part III.
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the memo was supposedly narrowly drawn to the specifics of al-Aulaqi’s case,
finding that targeting al-Aulaqi would be lawful only if capture were not
136
The memorandum sets out the legal analysis for the targeted
feasible.
killing of al-Aulaqi but neglects to “independently analyze the quality of the
137
evidence against him.”
The memo reportedly argues that the imminence criterion is satisfied if
a target is a leader of a group in conflict with the United States that attempts
to attack the United States whenever it gets the chance, regardless of
whether or not the leader is involved in any such attacks when he is
138
targeted.
According to this analysis, when the imminence requirement is
139
met, a trial is not warranted. As is argued in the imminence section above,
such analysis may in fact be true. A leader of a group fighting the United
States opens himself up to harm by taking part in hostilities. However, this is
not the case when the target is an American citizen. Targeted killing is
much different than a case in which an American is killed on the battlefield
of a traditional war. Under the laws of war, one is not required to capture
an American citizen and provide a jury trial and Supreme Court review if he
is found carrying a gun on the battlefield against the United States. “[I]t is
not necessarily illegal, in wartime, to kill a citizen without a trial. Lincoln’s
140
Union Army did it repeatedly, of course, during the Civil War.”
It must be remembered that targeted killing is the “premeditated killing
141
by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.”
Premeditation makes all the difference when a country targets its own
citizens in such a manner. The issue, then, is perhaps not that an American
citizen is killed, as that could happen in the course of a traditional war in
which an American takes up arms against the United States. The problem
142
arises when one is expressly targeted with such premeditated intent. As a
United States citizen, al-Aulaqi—and any American who becomes the object
of targeted killing carried out by the United States—was entitled to more
due process simply by virtue of his citizenship and the corresponding rights
provided by the Constitution. President Obama, in reference to his decision
136

137
138
139
140
141
142

See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1 (“The Obama administration’s secret legal
memorandum that opened the door to the killing of Anwar al-[Aulaqi] . . . found that it
would be lawful only if it were not feasible to take him alive . . . .”).
Id. at A12.
See Cole, supra note 7 (reporting on the content of the Obama Administration’s secret
legal memorandum regarding the killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi).
Id.
Id.
Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 406.
It could be argued that this point is contradicted by the Civil War, since during this
conflict the United States certainly knew United States citizens were being killed.
However, the Civil War was an internal conflict, and so it is a sort of anomaly that does not
disprove the theory presented.
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to target al-Aulaqi, told colleagues that the decision was “‘an easy one.’” It
should be anything but easy to deliberately decide to kill one’s own citizen.
It has been reported that the secret legal memorandum justifying the
killing of al-Aulaqi relied upon an executive ban against assassinations, a
federal law against murder, and the protections of the Bill of Rights, as well
144
as the laws of war.
The former two are perhaps less informative during
war, however, due to the nature of war itself. This is because if one is
fighting a war, it is not murder to kill an enemy combatant. Nor is it
assassination if one kills a leader who has opened himself up to attack by
145
partaking in a war.
These prohibitions must yield to the latter points of
the Constitution and International Humanitarian Law. As previously
mentioned, International Humanitarian Law does not take citizenship into
account, so the only possible basis for evaluating the targeting of an
American citizen is the Constitution itself, particularly the Due Process
146
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. If due process analysis is warranted when
detention is used in the War on Terror, then it is certainly warranted in
147
targeted killing. The Obama memorandum supposedly cites various cases
that allow the government to detain or try in military court Americans who
148
join enemy forces in order to justify targeted killing.
There is a large
difference, however, between detention and loss of life.
According to leaked descriptions of the memorandum, joining an enemy
force effectively deprived al-Aulaqi of a citizen’s due process rights, as the
protection of innocent lives should be weighed to a greater extent than the
149
possible death of a suspect.
Such a utilitarian argument, while valid,
nevertheless goes against the basic rights granted by the Constitution. The
Constitution does not say that one’s life can be deprived if others will be

143
144

145

146
147

148
149

See Becker & Shane, supra note 98, at A10.
See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12 (detailing the Justice Department’s
rejection of potential legal prohibitions on killing al-Aulaqi). The ban on assassinations,
promulgated by President Reagan in response to alleged abuses by intelligence agencies,
appears in Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,952 (Dec. 8, 1981), while the
prohibition of murder is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006).
See Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, From Humanitarian Intervention to
Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence, 118 ETHICS 228, 253 (2008) (“Surely, it
would have been permissible for someone to have assassinated Stalin in the 1930s.”). See
generally Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1231 (characterizing targeted killings as
“[coming] close to prohibited acts of assassination”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 409–10 (arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s due
process rights are controlling in determining the legality of targeted killings of suspected
terrorists).
See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12 (reporting on the memorandum’s
purported interpretation of what constitutes due process for al-Aulaqi).
Justifying the Killing of an American, supra note 11, at A22.
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saved. Rather, one may not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
150
due process of law.” There is no balancing present. And while some may
think it would be the moral decision to save the innocent lives that hang in
the balance, is it not also moral to give credence to one’s constitutional
rights? Especially with regard to the manner in which targeted killing is
carried out, it is furthermore difficult to make such a balance in any case.
No one can tell how many lives are in the balance, and thus the United
States should value the lives of its own citizens that are targeted, rather than
the hypothetical ones that may be put at risk via terrorist attack.
Moreover, if joining an enemy force causes one to be deprived of due
151
process rights, as the memo supposedly asserts, then a long line of
Supreme Court cases must be overturned. Even enemies are sometimes
afforded rights under the Constitution during times of war. The Supreme
Court decided that U.S. laws extend throughout United States territory,
152
including Guantanamo Bay, and that this is true even for non-citizen
153
detainees.
If even non-citizen detainees in the War on Terror are
guaranteed the right of due process inherent in the writ of habeas corpus,
then surely United States citizens must be guaranteed due process rights as
154
well.
American citizens are guaranteed the right to due process
155
throughout the world.
“The point is straightforward: the Due Process
Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—
cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
156
procedures.”
Due process, therefore, must apply even to American
citizens who take part in non-international armed conflicts against the
United States.

2. Counterarguments Against Due Process
Those who disagree with such an assertion regarding the rights held by
an American acting against the United States could argue that, especially in
al-Aulaqi’s case, his American citizenship is nothing more than an accident
150
151
152
153
154

155
156

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1 (noting that the memo’s analysis relied, in
part, on al-Aulaqi’s support of al Qaeda, an enemy force).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that even non-citizens are
“entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention”).
Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that “due process demands
that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker”).
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (noting that the Bill of Rights constrains the
actions of the government even against citizens abroad).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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of birth. He had no control whatsoever over where he was born, and he had
no loyalty or allegiance to the United States. Under this view, it is perhaps
unfair to grant al-Aulaqi the further due process rights accorded to
American citizens for no other reason than he happened to be born on
American soil.
But a counterargument in this vein runs contrary to the very principles
inherent in American citizenship. If al-Aulaqi were not afforded the same
rights as other American citizens, there could potentially be nothing to stop
the United States government from taking these rights away from other
citizens as well. As unfair as it may seem to some, allowing al-Aulaqi all of
the rights of an American citizen—even despite the fact that his citizenship
could be a mere accident of birth—is the best way to ensure these rights for
all Americans. A person is a United States citizen by virtue of being born on
157
American soil.
If further conditions were required to receive citizenship,
there is no telling how the government would do so. Making exceptions for
al-Aulaqi to be deprived of his citizenship could lead to a slippery slope
whereby Americans are deprived of their rights as United States citizens,
perhaps sometimes for reasons just as seemingly trivial as an accident of
birth. When the rights of American citizens hang in the balance, caution
should be used to protect these rights.
Additionally, under contractarianism, citizens of the United States
subject themselves to the rights and protections of the United States
158
government.
However, via such acts as treason or rebellion, some may
argue that it is possible for a citizen to break such a contract. As a result, it
would be permissible for the United States to engage in targeted killing to
kill one of its own citizens, provided that the citizen has effectively rejected
his “contract” with America. But, is it even possible for a citizen to give up
such rights? Short of openly denouncing one’s citizenship and breaking all
ties with the United States, it is not possible to simply lose one’s rights as a
United States citizen. And even then it may not be possible. American
citizens, no matter where they are located, are necessarily entitled to the
159
considerations of due process by virtue of their citizenship.
One cannot
break this tie. In terms of targeted killing, due process can never be

157

158

159

8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth: (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof . . . .”).
See Michael Walzer, contract, social, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 164 (Ted
Honderich ed., 1995) (detailing that under contract theory “political society is a human
construct”).
See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5; see also Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 435 (arguing that “[t]he
relationship between Boumediene and Mathews suggests that the Due Process Clause
applies . . . to government action worldwide”).
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satisfied, and hence it is never permissible for the United States to kill one of
its own American citizens via targeted killing.

3. Due Process for American Citizens
So what, then, does due process entail? It is true that one must not
capture a United States citizen and give him a jury trial and Supreme Court
review if he is found carrying a gun on the battlefield against the United
States; he would then be subject to force immediately, as he poses an
160
imminent threat in war. In terms of targeted killing, where a citizen is not
explicitly found in a battlefield situation, due process seems to require more
161
than a military risk analysis.
To some, this means allowing a targeted
killing decision to be the subject of review before an Article III judge prior
162
to it being carried out.
To others, even a “post-deprivation procedure”
like that in North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, may be enough,
allowing one to challenge the legality of a targeted killing after the death has
163
occurred.
The latter suggestion clearly has more problems than the
former, as challenging the deprivation of one’s life after the fact is mere
show; there could obviously be no remedy for the victim if the killing is
164
found to be unwarranted.
Given the constantly changing circumstances in the War on Terror, even
the former could not be enough, as it would be akin to putting someone on
trial for murder without being given the opportunity to defend oneself. The
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See Michael Bahar, As Necessity Creates the Rule: Eisentrager, Boumediene, and the Enemy—
How Strategic Realities Can Constitutionally Require Greater Rights for Detainees in the Wars of the
Twenty-First Century, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 300, 324 (2009).
Justifying the Killing of an American, supra note 11, at A22.
Lindsay Kwoka, Comment, Trial by Sniper: The Legality of Targeted Killing in the War on
Terror, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 301, 303 (2011) (proposing that the President’s decision “to
target a citizen for death should be reviewed in a private hearing before an Article III
judge before the killing is carried out”).
211 U.S. 306 (1908). See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 410–13 (arguing that just as
Supreme Court precedents allow a due process right to judicial review after
imprisonment for alleged terrorists, a form of judicial review may analogously be
appropriate after an attack).
This, in a sense, is exactly the type of justice currently being sought by the families of alAulaqi, his son Abdulrahman, and Samir Khan. In al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, their families are
challenging the targeted killing of these three American citizens as violating the
Constitution’s guarantee against the deprivation of life without due process of law. The
complaint, which seeks unspecified damages, was filed against four senior national
security officials, including Secretary of Defense Leon C. Panetta, former CIA Director
David H. Petraeus, and two senior commanders of the Special Operations Command of
the military, Admiral William H. McRaven of the Navy and Lieutenant General Joseph
Votel of the Army. The complaint specifically alleges a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments as well as the Bill of Attainder Clause of the United States Constitution.
Complaint at 15–16, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July, 18, 2012).
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OLC memorandum justifying the targeted killing of al-Aulaqi reportedly
offers such “due process,” as it asserts that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
of due process can be satisfied via the internal deliberation of the executive
165
As Attorney General Eric Holder once put it, “‘[d]ue process’
branch.
and ‘judicial process’ ‘are not one and the same, particularly when it comes
166
to national security.’” The Sixth Amendment, however, grants citizens the
167
right to confront their accusers and to set forth witnesses in their favor;
none of this is possible in terms of targeted killing. The ad hoc
decisionmaking of the executive branch or of an Article III judge does not
allow one to confront one’s accusers. Moreover, if one were to present
oneself for such a trial, one would be detained indefinitely as a prisoner of
war. “[T]he idea that an American citizen should be forced to choose
between death and potentially indefinite detention simply because the
executive has decided she is a terrorist hardly seems consistent with any
168
coherent notion of citizenship.”
Even if the United States were to set forth criterion in which it clearly
and publicly states for what actions a citizen would be subject to targeted
killing, this would not be enough. Each individual citizen has a right to
defend oneself against charges that would render a citizen subject to
169
targeted killing.
This, again, does not mean that an American citizen
cannot be targeted on the battlefield. It does mean, though, that there is a
major difference between the premeditation involved in targeted killing and
the perchance death of an American on a battlefield. Due process against
United States citizens in terms of targeted killing can never reach a level of
acceptability; no amount of due process can justify targeted killing.
Rather than provide for executive or judicial review of a decision to
utilize targeted killing—which does not allow one to confront his accusers—
or to require a citizen to surrender—which would be highly impractical—
the only option is to capture American citizens or to kill them in the heat of
battle according to traditional laws of war. It can be argued that detaining
American citizens can lead to problems of its own, such as indefinite
detention, regardless of whether or not the Supreme Court has invalidated
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Becker & Shane, supra note 98, at A1. Note that the weekly counterterrorism meetings at
the White House in which security officials discuss the latest developments regarding
those on the kill list are known derisively amongst some as “‘Terror Tuesday’ meetings.”
Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadershipin-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Charlie Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings, Holder Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at A18
[hereinafter Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings].
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 188.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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170

It is certainly a valid argument that problems exist when
such practices.
the United States detains its own citizens under military authority; but such
concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment. What is pertinent here is
that an American citizen be given the chance to be captured or killed
according to just war theory, and that his rights as an American citizen are
not violated in the process.
Consequently, capturing American citizens or killing them in traditional
battles should be the only practices used by the United States against its own
citizens. Doing so is the only way to ensure that Americans in these
situations receive proper due process under both the laws of war and laws of
the United States itself. Targeted killing does not allow for these rights to be
recognized. Therefore, United States citizens retain the rights of lex generalis
under the Constitution even while being subjected to the lex specialis of
171
armed conflict.

C. Morality and Law in the Targeting of American Citizens
At the heart of the issue is not whether a state can actually use targeted
killing against its own: the United States proved that a state can do so when
it targeted al-Aulaqi. Instead, the question is whether it is legally—and
morally—proper to do so. When the United States targets its own citizens,
there are three elements that come into play: citizenship, premeditation,
and due process. Each element, when taken alone, may not be sufficient to
allow the targeting of one’s own citizens to reach a level of iniquity. When
taken together, the interplay of these three factors points to a major
undermining of one’s rights that can be expressed in a moral legal
framework.

1. Legal Framework
Although armed conflict necessarily allows the use of coercive measures
172
that are not usually lawful in other contexts, International Humanitarian
Law does not make certain distinctions.
Namely, International
Humanitarian Law and the laws of war make no reference to nationality or
173
citizenship when defining combatants in war.
When invoking the domestic analogy, it is nevertheless clear that even
the United States takes citizenship into account to a certain extent because
170
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172
173

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (setting forth that the United States may
detain its own citizens as enemy combatants, but that the writ of habeas corpus has not
been suspended).
Thanks to Professor Claire Finkelstein for conversations which sparked this idea.
Kutz, supra note 14, at 152–53.
First Additional Protocol, supra note 34, at arts. 43 & 44.
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The Obama
the domestic context infers American citizenship.
Administration took into account citizenship both when it invoked domestic
cases in the memorandum justifying the killing of al-Aulaqi and when it
175
wrote the memo itself.
By writing the memo, the Obama Administration
effectively assented to the need for extra justification when a United States
citizen is the object of targeted killing. The laws of war, in this sense, are
thus more permissive in that they do not take into account citizenship when
targeted killing occurs, whereas domestic law does.
The interpretation of the interplay between International Humanitarian
Law and domestic law, as supposedly set forth in the Obama memorandum
justifying the targeting of al-Aulaqi, is necessarily flawed, as it attempts to
allow one to do in one context what the other would not allow. In the
domestic analogy, as in the laws of war, one may kill a criminal that poses an
176
imminent threat.
One may not, however, premeditatively kill a criminal
177
that one thinks will commit a crime in the distant future.
Conversely,
International Humanitarian Law, to a certain extent, does allow preemptive
178
strikes.
It seems that the United States uses domestic law to invoke citizenship,
but then uses International Humanitarian Law to disregard the same
element of citizenship. When using targeted killing—a practice that is by
definition premeditative—against its own citizens, the United States uses one
law to allow them to do what another—domestic law—would not allow. This
is because domestic law, which does take into account citizenship, does not
allow premeditative strikes, while International Humanitarian Law does not
take into account citizenship but does allow certain premeditative strikes.
The United States takes into account aspects of the domestic law, specifically
one’s citizenship, to appear as if they are satisfying this law’s elements. This
effectively results in an end-run around domestic law in a manner that seems
to set it forth as authoritative while simultaneously disregarding it. The legal
framework for the targeted killing of one’s own citizens is therefore tenuous
at best.

2. Morality as Legal Framework
But why does the United States invoke the domestic analogy at all? If
International Humanitarian Law does not take into account citizenship,
then there is no need to even address it. Regardless of this fact, the Obama
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Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings, supra note 166, at A18.
Id.; Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985).
Id.
WALZER, supra note 13, at 80–85.
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Administration wrote an entire memo justifying its use of force against al179
This could be because the Administration was simply trying to
Aulaqi.
insulate itself from criticism. But if this were the case, then it would behoove
the Administration to release its analysis.
Conversely, such a memo could possibly have been written because there
is something normatively repugnant about the use of targeted killing against
one’s own citizens. A memo could thereby reassure the Administration that
it was proceeding in a sound manner. Even if an armed conflict exists in a
traditional war, where the laws of war are more established, issues still
remain regarding the targeted killing of one’s own citizens, and thus these
concerns would still exist.
It is not necessarily the process involved in targeted killing that causes
180
apprehension, as even preapproval can lead to problems of its own.
It is
rather that there is a type of moral defect in a law that allows a government
to kill its own citizens in such a manner. “The State, even as it punishes,
must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human
181
beings.” However, it is precisely this human dignity of the targeted that is
not taken into account. The interplay of the human dignity of the targeted
with the lack of due process given to American citizens points towards a
normative problem with the targeted killing of one’s own citizens.
It was asserted above that due process cannot be satisfied in the targeted
killing of an American citizen by the United States. While that argument
still stands, the moral outrage of targeting one’s own citizen adds an extra
element to the case against this practice. Rather than International
Humanitarian Law, it is the human rights model that lends credence to the
analysis of evaluating the taking of our own citizens’ life. The human rights
model, codified in such treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenantt on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), is meant to promote “the inherent
182
dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all.” The human rights
model, however, defers to International Humanitarian Law during times of
183
armed conflict. But this does not mean that such a deferral is appropriate.
The right to life in the human rights model is non-derogable; one’s life can-
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Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1.
See supra Part VI.B.3.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at preamble (Dec. 10, 1948).
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240
(July 8) (“[W]hat is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”).
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184

It is this morality that should be taken into
not be deprived arbitrarily.
account in the legal framework that sets the standards for the United States
and its use of force, and it is this morality that should be implemented in
order to circumvent the overly permissive character of International
Humanitarian Law. The human rights element seems to complement the
domestic analogy in a manner consistent with the preservation of a citizen’s
rights, as both the due process analysis under the Constitution and the
human rights model would preserve a citizen’s right to life in the face of
targeted killing.

VII. CONCLUSION
Under the laws of war there are thus many constraints that apply to
targeted killing regardless of one’s citizenship. Targeted killing by the United States should only be used against combatants involved in an armed
conflict with the United States. Members of al-Qaeda should receive
combatant status, with the corresponding protections and risks that this
status entails, regardless of their citizenship. The conflict between the
United States and al-Qaeda may indeed be characterized as a noninternational armed conflict. But the hostilities between the United States
and AQAP may not, as there is not a sufficient amount of organization
between al-Qaeda and AQAP to deem them one organization and because
co-belligerency does not exist amongst non-state actors under the laws of
war.
A disproportionate amount of force may never be used against an
enemy, and the enemy must always pose an imminent danger for force to be
warranted. The United States may therefore not use targeted killing when
imminence is questionable, when capture is feasible, or when civilian lives
are at risk of becoming collateral damage. Problems exist when the United
States uses CIA agents to engage in targeted killings, regardless of the
citizenship of those they target. The CIA is not part of the military, and thus
its members are not combatants under just war theory. They should not be
able to use targeted killing against enemies in any circumstances.
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See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 4, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217 (“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to
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However, if the military were to carry out targeted killing, there is a
conspicuous distinction that should be made based on one’s citizenship.
That is, the United States should never partake in targeted killing against its
own citizens. No amount of due process is able to ameliorate the problems
inherent with taking the life of one’s own citizens in this premeditated
manner. One’s right to life and to a trial under the Constitution forbids it.
Indeed, sometimes the “laws we should adopt do not directly correspond to
185
morality.”
But sometimes they do. An American’s right to life under the
Constitution reveals such morality. The lack of distinction in terms of one’s
citizenship under the laws of war, however, does not do so. The United
States should therefore look to a combination of domestic law and the
human rights model when dealing with its own citizens in terms of targeted
killing. The United States, as it does now, should take into account the
citizenship of those that they target. When the person that is targeted is an
American citizen, the United States should defer to the human rights model;
the United States should refrain from using targeted killing against its own
citizens. This is the only way the United States can adhere to the law while
simultaneously invoking morality.
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